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This Elmhirst lecture first discusses the features of the institutional environment which allow 
rural people in low income countries to design, plan and implement their own rural development. 
These are divided into two broad groups: the institutional environment for rural development 
(environment for the private sector, communities and civil society, local government, and sector 
institutions) and the many factors governing profitability of investment in agriculture. While in 
many poor countries the institutional environment has improved over the last 20 years, the most 
poorly performing countries still have by far the poorest environment for local government in the 
world. Within an empowering institutional environment, the rate of agricultural and rural 
development is determined by investments of many different types that in turn depend primarily 
on the profitability of agriculture. The paper discusses the large number of factors which 
determine profitability. Few of these are under the direct control of farmers or agricultural sector 
institutions, but depend on governance and investments in other sectors such as trade and 
transport. In many of the poorest countries there has been considerable improvement in macro-
economic management and sector policies over the past 20 years, but progress in international 
and intra-regional trade policies, in agricultural trade policies, in transport infrastructure, and in 
agricultural research and extension have been limited. 
   
Introduction 
Between 1981 and 2001 the number of poor people living with incomes of less than a dollar a 
day in East and South Asia declined from 1234 million to 702 million, or a decline of 532 
                                                 
1 Hans Binswanger is a fellow at the Institute for Economic Research on Innovation at the Tshwane University of 
Technology, Tshwane, South Africa, and Chairman, Community and Enterprise Development Against Stigma 
(CEDAS Trust). This Elmhirst lecture is a revised version of his farewell lecture from the World Bank delivered on 
November 30, 2004.    2
million, of which the decline in China alone was 422 million. At the same time the number of 
people living with less than a dollar a day in Sub-Saharan Africa rose from 164 million to 316 
million, or by 152 million. In percentage terms poverty declined in East Asia from nearly 58 
percent to 15 percent, and in South Asia from 51 percent to 31 percent, while it increased from 
42 to 47 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa (Chen and Ravallion, 2004). Much of these enormous 
differences in poverty outcomes were the consequences of sharply different performances in 
agricultural and rural development between the different Regions. More specifically Ravallion 
and Chen 2004 show that “rural economic growth was far more important to national poverty 
reduction than urban economic growth; agriculture played a far more important role than the 
secondary or tertiary sources of GDP. Rising inequality within the rural sector greatly slowed 
poverty reduction….Taxation of farmers and inflation hurt the rural poor; external trade had little 
short term impact.” (p.1). In an earlier paper, Ravallion and Datt (1995) had shown that in India 
rural growth is far more powerful in reducing national poverty (both rural and urban) than urban 
growth, while urban growth only reduced urban poverty.  
 
During last four decades the agricultural performance of Sub-Saharan Africa has continuously 
decline: From 1961-64 to 1995-98 per capita agricultural production has fallen by 13 percent in 
Africa, whereas in Asia it has grown by 69 percent (Gelb et al. 2000, chapter 6).  The recent 
poverty data and findings are perhaps the most powerful demonstration we have ever had that the 
fate of most of the world’s extremely poor people depends on their countries’ and regions’ 
performance in agricultural and rural development. The question of which factors which lead to 
rapid agricultural and rural development is therefore a central issue of development economics.   
 
In my paper on “Patterns of Rural Development: Painful Lessons,” (1996), I discussed  how the 
fields of Agricultural and Rural Development slowly overcame the ideological and scientific 
biases which ruled them until the 1960’s when I first became interested in these subjects. These 
biases had helped foster policies that inflicted untold damage on rural populations in the 
developing World. Development policies of countries and of donor institutions have over time 
been revised using the growing knowledge. This includes the agricultural and rural development 
strategy advocated by the World Bank, which was last subject to intense scrutiny and consensus 
building for the version published in 2003. The objectives of this lecture, are therefore not to   3
question the consensus views which our profession has developed over the last five decades or 
the World Bank agricultural and rural development strategy which derives from it. Nor will this 
lecture add significant new knowledge developed over the past few years. Instead the objective is 
to summarize once again what is known about how to foster agricultural and rural development 
in an easily understandable analytical framework. In addition, for some ideas I will discuss how 
they evolved in the World Bank, and how well they are applied by that institution for which I 
have worked for 25 years.
2 The lecture may therefore appear to be a bit World Bank centric.  
 
The basic premise of this paper is that rural people have to be the key actors in planning and 
implementing their own agricultural and rural development (World Bank, 2002).
3  Despite our 
knowledge, farmers and other rural people in Africa and many other parts of the developing 
world are still blocked or hindered in doing this by poor institutions, policies, technology and 
insufficient human and physical capital. Therefore many rural areas are still underperforming. 
This under-performance is not caused by lack of knowledge, but usually by deliberate policies 
and institutions which tend to reduce agricultural profitability and dis-empower rural people, 
especially the poor and women (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997).  
 
In “Painful Lessons” I discussed patterns of under-performance relative to agricultural potential. 
In this lecture I will concentrate primarily on one of these pattern of “agricultural stagnation” 
which today primarily includes the low income countries in Africa but also countries in other 
Regions such as Haiti, Nepal, North Korea, Myanmar, and others . I will also comment on 
countries in Latin America and elsewhere which have had a reasonable agricultural growth rates, 
but have “prematurely expulsed agricultural labor” and therefore failed to reduce rural poverty. 
These countries will be contrasted with experience from the recent high performers in Asia 
                                                 
2 The lecture covers a very large area of knowledge, and many important topics are only briefly touched upon. A 
first place to look for more in depth discussion would be the rural development strategy of 2003, as well as other 
references cited.  
 
3 “From Many Lands: Voices of the Poor”  (Narayan and Pettesch, 2002) let poor people speak on their own behalf, 
and they were particularly clear about being allowed to create their own institutions and organizations and manage 
their own development and the financial and other resources needed for that. The Sourcebook on Empowerment and 
Poverty Reduction Policy of the World Bank (2002) responds to this expressed desire and analyzes the full range of  
factors, policies and programs needed to respond to their desire to be fully empowered for their own development.     4
which, over the past three decades have benefited from the Green Revolution, and gradually 
improving institutional and policy environments  
 
The key factors that empower rural people and therefore determine a country’s performance in  
agricultural and rural development fall into two broad groups: (i) the institutional environment 
for rural development, including for agricultural development; and (ii) the policies and other 
factors which determine farm profits, and therefore agricultural investment and most of rural 
growth. The institutional environment and the policies not only determine rural growth, but also 
determine who can participate in agricultural and rural development, and the distribution of the 
benefits. This lecture will focus mostly on growth. Of course the distribution of the benefits is 
equally important, not only for its own sake, but also because of the mounting evidence that 
more equal income and asset distributions are good for growth and poverty reduction.   
 
The institutional pillars of rural development 
In 1980, in a typical under-performing low income country in Africa and elsewhere in 1980, a 
young rural women (or man) who wanted to contribute to the development of her community 
found herself almost completely disempowered. Three of the five pillars of the institutional 
environment for rural development below were poorly developed: The first pillar, the private 
sector, was largely confined to small scale farming and other informal sector activities. Much of 
the marketing, input supply and agro-processing was in the hands of parastatal enterprises. The 
second institutional pillar, independent civil society organizations, community organizations, and 
even traditional authorities were highly constrained or suppressed. In the wake of decolonization, 
central governments had suppressed the third pillar, local government, or starved it of fiscal 
authority and resources. None of these three pillars were providing much opportunity for the 
young woman or man, and s/he had to find a way to join the central government or its centralized 
sector institutions if s/he wanted to contribute to development of her or his community. But these 
central institutions failed the rural sector miserably (World Bank, 1982).  
 
The institutional environment for rural development and agriculture is the single most important 
performance issue in the under-performing countries. A well structured set of institutions can   5
tackle all the complex components required for rural development, from health and education to 
infrastructure, agricultural services, social protection, natural resource management, and more. 
Not only does the institutional environment determine who can contribute to development and 
how successful it will be, it also is the most important determinant of the distribution of the 
benefits. More specifically, where institutions are dis-empowering , they can be used by strong 
individuals and groups to direct the benefits of development to themselves, via elite capture.  
 
Local development is a core component of rural development, although the latter also involves 
non-local components such as transport, processing and marketing activities. No institution by 
itself can carry the burden of local development. Instead the paradigm that has emerged gives 
equal weight to the private sector, communities and civil society, local government, and the 
sector institutions such as health, education and agriculture (World Bank 2004). This is a 
considerable departure from the past when different disciplines and sectors single mindedly 
advocated approaches involving only one of the four sets of actors. A broad consensus has been 
reached that local development (and therefore rural developments) has to be viewed as a co-
production by all these four groups of actors. They need to take account their comparative 
advantage, delegate functions to the other partners in co-production, and reform themselves to be 































How such an integrated approach would be fostered in a  particular country should depend on 
past history, what currently exists and can be built on, the prevailing traditions and cultures, and 
past history, and a diagnosis of the existing capacities and dis-functionalities. One can think of 
representing the capacities of each of the sectors in a country by the size of the circles in a 
country-specific variant of figure one. Different countries would have very different diagrams 
with some having very small circles for local governments while others would have small circles 
for their communities. Only country-specific analysis can reveal where the greatest weaknesses 
are and the best opportunities for improvements in the institutional environment. There are 
simply no universally applicable generalizations or magic bullets.   
 
Pillar 1: The private sector 
The World Bank’s structural adjustment lending identified the suppression of the private sector, 
the underperformance of the parastatal sector, and the fiscal black holes they created as the root 
cause of the underperformance problem. While this view was partially correct, it was a far too 
narrow one, as we soon were to learn. The withdrawal of the parastatal sector did not lead to 
spontaneous and rapid growth of private sector replacements. Far too many other problems 
existed in what we now call the “business environment,” including corruption, weak enforcement 
of contracts, over-regulation, poor infrastructure and services, all of which lead to an excessive 
cost of doing business. It is only in the last few years that we see cross-sector analytical work 
and programs which addresses the business environment in truly systematic way (World Bank, 
2005b,c, Economic Commission for Africa, 2004, 2005a).  
 
Pillar 2: Communities, Civil Society and Social Capital 
In the early nineties the World Bank woke up to the important role of communities, civil society 
and social capital, which activists and academics had emphasized much before them. In the 
World Bank the new focus on communities came from two sources: Sector specialists in water 
supply and natural resource management had started in the 1980s to involve communities  
systematically, and found it to enhance project performance significantly; these lessons were 
progressively integrated into project practices (World Bank 1996b). The other source was social 
funds, which quickly discovered the power of communities to assist in project design and   7
implementation. In some of the early Social Funds, NGOs were used as intermediaries to 
substitute for the presumed lack of capacity at the community level. But this approach proved to 
be costly and has increasingly been abandoned in favor of direct empowerment of communities 
with knowledge and resources, while NGOs remain important facilitators and sources of 
knowledge. From letting communities participate in the design, finance, and maintenance of 
specific micro-projects, World Bank-financed  CDD programs and social funds have moved on 
to truly empower them to chose, design, and execute a large range of micro-projects, by 
transferring both the responsibility and the co-financing resources for these project to them. At 
about the same time social scientists discovered the merits of  social capital and traditional 
institutions, and in many cases they are now systematically assessed and integrated into policies 
and programs to put in place a conducive environment for their participation and growth, 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2005 a,b, World Bank 2003b). 
 
Since the mid 1980s a broad range of NGOs started to sharply criticize donor financed projects, 
policies and structural adjustment programs (Mallaby, 2004). Democratization in Africa and in 
other parts of the developing world created space for national and local advocacy and service 
NGOs (Economic Commission for Africa 2005a, b). For agricultural development, a particularly 
important development is the formation and progressive development of independent farmers’ 
organizations, and micro-finance institutions (World Bank, 1991). They are increasingly 
replacing or complementing cooperatives which were often created by the state, and did not 
really lead to empowerment. The growth and development of communities, NGOs, and social 
capital is not only important for the implementation of development programs, diversity and 
strength of these organizations at the local and national level is also critical as a defense against 
elite capture of programs and project benefits.  
 
Pillar 3: Local government 
During the late 1980s democratization in Latin America, and later in other parts of the World, led 
to a political movement for the restoration or strengthening of local governments. Nevertheless, 
most World Bank and IMF economists could only talk about the fiscal dangers of 
decentralization, rarely making a distinction between provincial/state and local governments 
(Tanzi, 1991). They ignored the fact that it was usually provincial and state governments, as well   8
as major cities, not the local governments, which were building costly institutions, over-spending 
and over-borrowing,  and draining the coffers of central governments. Indeed, in countries as far 
apart as Mexico and India, states or provinces were themselves highly centralized, and a major 
factor in disempowering local rural populations. Fortunately by the mid 1990s, the negative 
views on decentralization had given way to a more balanced assessment, recognizing both 
successes and failures in decentralization (Faguet, 1997, Piriou-Sall, 1997, World Bank, 1995). 
Equal emphasis on political, administrative and fiscal decentralization is needed. Unsuccessful 
decentralization programs are almost always characterized by inadequate allocation of fiscal 
resources to the local level decentralization (Manor and Crook, 1998, Manor 1999, Shah 1994). 
Successful decentralization is often pursued by strong leaders in relatively strong states, and puts 
a lot of emphasis on accountability at all levels, (Manor 1997).  
 
Local governments can become an instrument for elite capture and corruption. To prevent that, 
they must be democratic institutions, but that in itself is not enough. Without strong communities 
and civil society, and a strong local private sector, local governments will not be subject to the 
scrutiny and the bargaining processes which are needed to make local development inclusive and 
efficient. A bargaining equilibrium along the lines of the Becker theorem is needed as much at 
the local as at the national level to lead to Pareto-efficient development programs (Becker, 1983, 
1985)
 4   
 
In the early 1990s the World Bank first discovered the power of local governments, or local 
development councils associated with them, in its Community-Driven Development Programs in 
Mexico (World Bank, 1991b), and later in North East Brazil. The innovation spread from there 
                                                 
4 The Becker Theorem states that bargaining will lead to decisions and outcomes that will benefit all stakeholders or 
pressure groups (Pareto/welfare-improving choices) if the following conditions hold. 1. All pressure groups have 
correct and equal information about the consequences of each option for each stakeholder group. 2. All pressure 
groups have equal lobbying power or technology. 3. All decision and associated expenditures have to be evaluated 
against a single aggregate budget constraint. 4. Redistribution is costly. 4. The usual convexity properties that ensure 
a unique maximum sum for the model. 
The logic of this theorem is simple. If all groups have full information and equal bargaining power, no group can 
secure unanimity on proposals that benefit it alone. So the bargaining process will drive participants towards 
proposals that benefit most  stakeholders the most. The common budget constraint connects the decisions to each 
other and ensures that decisions improve welfare for all groups. Of course the Becker Theorem portrays an ideal 
which human institutions can at best approximate, but institutional design and development must seek such 
increasing approximation.  
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to Indonesia and East Asia, then to Africa and the rest of the world. Social funds started to build 
the capacity of local governments, and entrust them with coordination and some implementation 
functions, and eventually the distinction between community driven development and social 
funds disappeared. A research program on Decentralization, Fiscal Systems and Rural  
Development in the mid 1990s strengthened our understanding of this nexus of issues (McLean 
et al., 1998, Piriou-Sall, 1998). It analyzed the level of decentralization of rural service delivery 
in 19 countries (or provinces thereof) across the World (Figure 1). Four African countries had the 
lowest decentralization scores, while Jianxi province in China had the highest one. Latin 
American countries scored in the upper half, while Karnataka state of India ranked ninth and 
Punjab, Pakistan 13
th.   
 
Figure2: Levels of Decentralized Rural Service Delivery in 19 developing countries.  
 
The recent Governance Report of the Economic Commission for Africa (2005a), shows that not 
much progress has been made on decentralization in Africa in the decade and a half since the 
above assessment: Decentralization, along with corruption, still receives one of the lowest scores 
of a whole series of governance indicators studied in 28 countries of Africa.  



























There are powerful reasons for using the lowest level of local government for coordination and 
execution of rural development and social safety net activities. It is at the local level that 
transparency is relatively easy to achieve, since people know their areas and can often verify the 
result of expenditures, or lack thereof, with their own eyes. Coordination of the many sectors 
involved in rural development at central levels is almost impossible given the heterogeneity of 
rural space. On the other hand it is feasible at the local level, where actors have direct knowledge 
of the local conditions and the capabilities of their partners. Empowered and properly resourced  
local governments can mobilize latent capacities in communities and at the local level more 
easily than centralized systems. And finally, local governments does exist in remote and 
disadvantaged areas where neither NGOs nor the private sector find it attractive to operate.    
 
In most OECD countries and in the high performing China, local governments perform functions 
in education, health, social protection, environment, agriculture, land, local and community 
infrastructure, and promotion of private sector development. They are a multi-sector tool, better 
able than any other institution to coordinate local development and the different actors in 
communities, civil society, the private sector, and the sectors. Of course even their coordination 
capacity is always imperfect and in need of constant re-evaluation and development up.   
 
Pillar 4: Sector institutions 
In 1980, sector institutions were the main focus donor financed programs programs, even though 
they proved again and again that they did were unable to effectively implement programs in 
widely dispersed rural areas, but rather gobbled up a large proportion of project resources just for 
functioning. There has been a growing realization that the sector institutions should delegate 
implementation to the private sector, communities, civil society organization, and local 
governments, using the principle of subsidiarity.
5 The previously discussed pillars of the 
institutional environment will not reach their full potential without a fundamental change in the 
sector institutions. In most cases they should change from providers of services and 
                                                 
5 The principle of subsidiarity states that functions should be allocated to the lowest level capable of effectively 
performing them while at the same time minimizing adverse spillover effects to neighboring units at the same or 
higher levels.    11
implementers of investment programs and projects to institutions in charge of policy 
formulation, standard setting, quality enhancement and quality control, and monitoring and 
evaluation. They also need to contract or otherwise assist in the financing of services and 
investments executed by others (World Bank, 2004). However some caution is needed here: The 
sector institutions have often been corrupt or gobbled up resources in other ways. In many cases 
the financing should therefore go via the intergovernmental fiscal system directly to local 
governments and communities, rather than via the sector institutions.   
 
Rural development involves almost all sector ministries, from the police, local government, 
education and health to land, environment, agriculture and more. Among these sector 
institutions, the ones specifically associated with agriculture and natural resources have often be 
a particularly sorry and corrupt lot. Agricultural credit institutions and insurance systems not 
only achieved little for small and poor farmers, they also developed into major fiscal black holes, 
benefiting primarily the wealthy. Ministries of lands have lacked an effective constituency to 
ensure proper budgets for them, are often highly centralized, and corrupt. Ministries of 
agriculture are notoriously weak and politicized. We have been, and still are, struggling mightily 
to remove direct control over research and extension, or the parastatals from them. In addition 
they are notoriously poor at collecting the necessary data, monitoring sector developments, 
analyzing sector policy issues, and designing and implementing appropriate agricultural policy 
regimes and programs. Worst of all, they are often captured by large farmer elites and function 
more like pressure groups to extract subsidies and other favors for them. Nevertheless lot of 
effort has been spent on reforming them, with relatively little to show for. One reason for the 
lack of success is that this has usually been done this on a project by project basis, rather than in 
programs to transform the sector institutions in a broad movement of governance and public 
sector reform. Only once a cross sector approach is taken do I see a chance for more success.   
 
Pillar 5: The Central government and other central institutions 
Today the functions of central governments considered important for development are 
significantly different from the roles they saw for themselves in the 1960s and 1970s, and which 
they were assigned by donors in the development programs of that time. The central government 
has the ultimate design, oversight and coordination role of national development programs,   12
including those for rural development. But central government is less and less in a direct service 
delivery and executing role, except in regards to defense, taxation, expenditure management, the 
management of the intergovernmental fiscal system, and the electoral processes.  
 
 
The Central Government has a particularly important role to play in bringing about the changes 
needed for this type of co-production among the four institutional pillars discussed above. It has 
to drive forward the process of decentralization of functions, resources and accountability 
mechanisms to local governments and to the end users, and to ensure that the sector institutions 
devolve service delivery functions to the other three actors, and transform themselves. It has to 
ensure that the business climate for the private sector improves, and that communities and civil 
society are free to develop and take on the development functions which correspond to them.  
 
Other specific central institutions, such as the judiciary, parliament, the press, and national civil 
society organizations are today recognized to have important functions for rural development as 
well, such as contract enforcement, resource allocation to national programs including 
agriculture and rural development, and provision of information. In addition they should be the 
guardians of good governance. In order to foster rural development, they should press for further 
devolution of power and resources to local levels, and communities, and/or the delegation of 
many functions to them and to the private sector.  
 
The agricultural and rural development profession still underestimate the importance of the 
institutional environment in general, and the importance of the local government pillar in 
particular. No comprehensive reviews of the state of the institutional environment for rural and 
agricultural development have yet been produced.  The tools to do so already exist, including a 
toolkit for the review of the institutional environment for community and local development, for 
reviewing the business environment, and the social environment (World Bank 2003, 2004a,b, 
2005e).  
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Agricultural Profits and Rural Investment 
Once a well performing institutional framework is in place, the pillars of rural development can 
function as semi-autonomous actors, and take on the great variety agricultural growth and rural 
development challenges, on their own and in collaboration with each others and with the central 
government. Except for rural areas with limited agricultural or natural resource potential, 
agricultural and rural development can then be viewed as primarily a multi-faceted investment 
issue. Few of the needed investments will occur if agriculture is not profitable. This is obvious 
for the on farm investments, but also applies to investments decided, financed, and executed by 
the other pillars. None of the other institutional pillars are in a position to invest and perform 
well unless agriculture and agro-industry are profitable. Unless they can save and have an 
investible surplus, communities will not have the means to finance or co-finance their 
investments members. Independent civil society organizations (rather than creations from the 
outside) must finance a significant share of their costs from local sources, and these again depend 
on directly or indirectly on profits from agriculture and other natural resource sectors Local 
governments which do not mobilize part of their resources from the local population tend not to 
be accountable to it (Manor, 2000), and therefore will not be the pillar of rural development they 
should be. Instead they will be highly vulnerable to elite capture. The local tax base in turn 
depends on agricultural and natural resource profits.  
 
It is often assumed that rural non-farm activities can be used as a source of profits and an engine 
of growth for rural development. But most rural non-farm activities depend directly or indirectly 
on agriculture and other natural resource sectors (Hazell and Hagbladde, 1993, World Bank, 
1983). Most of them produce goods and services which must be produced locally (rural home 
goods) that are linked to agriculture via forward, backward, and consumer demand linkages. 
Some industrial activities producing for the economy at large sometimes locate in rural areas 
because of low wages (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2003). Most examples of rural industrialization 
come from very high population density areas with good infrastructure. For other areas, the 
advantage of lower rural wages is frequently offset by other disadvantages of a rural location. 
Therefore the potential for rural industrialization is usually over-estimated. Agricultural growth, 
therefore, remains the single most important driver of the rural non-farm sector.  
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In areas with limited agricultural potential, investment opportunities will be limited even if the 
institutional environment is properly developed and agriculture in general is profitable. While 
these favorable conditions will enable the limited potential to be fully developed, that is not 
enough to provide for income growth of the populations in these areas. A development approach 
to these areas has to empower the local populations with the authority and sufficient fiscal 
resources to provide the necessary human development and social services, so that the new 
generations have the human capital needed if they choose to migrate, and those who choose to 
stay behind can combine remittances and social assistance with locally earned income for a 
decent living standard. As Foster and Rosenzweig (2003) have shown, such areas may also be 
able to attract some industrialization based on their lower labor costs.
6     
 
Agricultural profitability can vary along many different margins. The margins which arise 
between the world market and the farm gate are discussed first, followed by those which operate 
at the farm level.     
Margins of Profitability: From The World Market to the Farm Gate 
 
1.  Distorted World Prices 
A growing body of evidence has accumulated since the 1980s that OECD agricultural policies 
have a significant depressive effect on World Prices. Poor developing countries tend to be net 
gainers from these depressed world prices because their poor agricultural performance has made 
them into net importers of food. (Anderson and Tyers, 1990,). But their agriculture cannot grow 
without increased agricultural profits. Eliminating the restrictive OECD policies has therefore 
become a central issue for them. The Uruguay round had made some progress in brining 
agriculture into the normal international trade regime. But most countries imposed such high 
tariff bindings, that the impact of the Uruguay Round on reducing OECD protection has been 
                                                 
6 Foster and Rosenzweig showed that in India, rural industries have located preferably in areas which benefited 
relatively little from the green revolution and the subsequent agricultural development and where rural wages were 
generally lower. Rural industrialization has therefore reduced rural poverty and inequality among and within rural 
areas. Rapid growth of rural industries in the 1990s followed an increase in the overall growth rate of the economy, 
which was itself partly a consequence of improved agricultural development, and may have been aided by restrictive 
labor laws whose impact and enforcement may be less in rural areas than urban areas. It is not clear how much these 
lessons apply to the underperforming countries which are suffering from low overall and low agricultural growth.     15
minimal. (World Bank, 2005a, Ingco and Nash, 2004). Unfortunately by the summer of 2006 
there is little hope that the ongoing WTO negotiations will achieve much progress either.  
 
The major beneficiaries of reduced OECD protection would be the high agricultural performers 
in Asia and Latin America, as well as Canada and Australia. However, in the longer run, as the 
low performers address the roots of their underperformance, they too would benefit greatly from 
freer agricultural markets. 
  
2.  Overvalued exchange rates and Export taxes 
In the 1970s and 80s, OECD subsidies were not the most important depressor of Agricultural 
profitability in low income countries. Krueger, Valdez, and Schiff (1991) demonstrated that 
indirect taxation via exchange rate overvaluation and industrial protection was significantly more 
important than direct agricultural export taxes. Overvalued exchange rates not only depress 
export prices but also import prices of food such as rice, which have displaced traditional staple 
crops in urban markets, thereby depriving local farmers of their natural markets.  
 
The increasing recognition of the importance of macro-economic stability and relatively low 
import taxation, reinforced by adjustment lending, has significantly reduced the indirect effects, 
while the direct export taxes have largely disappeared (Binswanger and Townsend, 2000). Of 
course there are still a number of countries in which import protection of manufacturing imposes 
an indirect tax on agricultural exports. Nigeria is only just now starting to systematically 
implement policies to combat Dutch disease and other sources of over-valuation, South African 
agriculture is suffering from the high value of the Rand, and Zimbabwe continues to over-value 
its currency. After some progress in reducing export taxation in the Ivory Coast, the sharks have 
had a field day since the eruption of the conflict, and many direct taxation measures and 
monopoly systems have re-emerged to reduce farm gate prices for Cocoa and other export crops 
to a small fraction of the border price. Nevertheless, progress in developing countries macro-
economic, trade and agricultural policies has been far more important than on OECD subsidies. 
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3.  Phytosanitary rules and regulation 
These are steadily emerging as more important barriers for developing country agricultural and 
agro-industrial exports. (The latter are also a victim of tariff escalation). Their increasing 
stringency is driven by consumer demand factors, as well as by their potential to replace tariff 
barriers as a protection against imports (World Bank, 2005a). Developing countries have little 
choice but to insert themselves into the standard-setting processes and bodies, and to build up 
their capacity to comply with these regulations (Ingco and Nash, 2004). Small countries are at a 
particular disadvantage, as they will have difficulties providing the necessary services. Regional 
collaboration and integration will be necessary to enable compliance at an affordable cost.  
  
4.  Barriers to intra-regional trade 
The other margin of profitability of agriculture is increase in intra-regional trade in agricultural 
and agro-industrial commodities. Domestic demand for most agricultural commodities is price 
and income inelastic, rapid gains in production will inevitably lead to lower prices and quickly 
reduce gains in farm profits. Moreover high production volatility translates into high price 
variability and risk for the farmers. Opening trade opportunities within sub-regions can greatly 
reduce the negative impacts of these factors on producers, and increase regional food security. 
Despite these well known facts, progress in the area of regional integration in agriculture has 
been depressingly slow. In Latin America and South and South-East Asia, attempts at Regional 
integration have had little impact on intra-regional agricultural trade. A recent survey by the 
Economic Commission for Africa shows that “there have been some strides in trade, 
communications, macroeconomic policy and transport. Some regional economic communities 
have made significant strides in trade liberalization and facilitation,…in free movement of 
people,…in infrastructure,…and in peace and security… Overall, however, there are substantial 
gaps between the goals and achievements of most regional economic communities, particularly 
in greater internal trade, macroeconomic convergence, production and physical 
connectivity.”(Economic Commission for Africa, 2004, p.1).  
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5. Transport and handling costs 
High transport and handling costs have as detrimental an impact on producer incomes as low 
output and high input prices. They are putting many of the poor performers at a substantial 
disadvantage. High transport and handling costs not only affect export commodities, but also the 
imports of fertilizers, as well as the opportunities and costs of rural non-farm enterprises. Along 
with other factors discussed below, this is part of the explanation why many African farmers 
have to pay up to three times the price for fertilizer than farmers in Thailand, India or Brazil. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa contains a large share of the World’s landlocked countries and is poorly 
endowed with transport infrastructure. At 6.48 kilometers of roads per 100 square kilometers, 
road density is well below that in Latin America or Asia (12 km and 18 km per 100 square 
kilometers respectively). Transport costs are among the highest in the World, and for landlocked 
countries can reach as high as 77 percent of the value of exports (Economic Commission for 
Africa, 2004). But it is not just the state of infrastructure which counts, but also the policies, 
institutions and organizations in the transport sector. Before the 1980s most transport businesses 
in Africa were publicly owned and managed, and heavily regulated, including railways, bus and 
trucking companies, airports, seaports, and civil aviation. These organizations suffered heavy 
losses, partly because of low tariffs, and this reduced the viability of transport service operations 
and imposed heavy costs on both users and the national economies. Since the 1990s the transport 
business has mostly been deregulated, and transport policies now allow for market-determined 
decisions, enterprise autonomy, and private participation in the ownership and management of 
transport business. Most bus and trucking companies have been privatized, and governments 
generally agree on concessioning the railways, ports and harbors, and airports, and in some cases 
have already initiated the process. Remaining public enterprises have been given considerable 
autonomy, and arbitrary regulation has been replaced by regulation through consensual 
performance contracts. In the highway sector, setting up of more sustainable institutions — 
autonomous road agencies and dedicated road funds —- has become the norm, and in some 
countries has started to show positive results (World Bank, Africa Transport Unit website).  
 
A serious problem in Africa is the extractions and bribes imposed by the police and others at 
border posts and road blocks. “Along the West African coad corridors linking the ports of   18
Abidjan, Accra, Cotonu Dakar and Lomé to Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, truckers paid $322 
million in undue costs at police customs and gendarmerie checkpoints in 1997, partly because 
the Inter-State Road Transport Convention had not been implemented.” (Economic Commission 
for Africa 2004). Since these extractions respond to the profitability of the commodities 
transported, there is therefore a real danger that if other margins of profitability improve, these 
extractions will go up and prevent the transmission of improvements to the farm. Well organized 
producer organizations, combined with more analytical work, will be needed to ensure 
governments will eventually crack down on these practices. 
 
6. Financial services and interest rates 
Many poorly performing countries suffer from macro-economic instability and as a result have 
high real interests. Agriculture is rarely so profitable that it can compete with urban investments 
in such environments. In addition, rural areas in general and small farmers in particular face 
enormous disadvantages in financial markets. Clients are usually small and widely dispersed, 
increasing transactions cost. And seasonality and covariant risk make financial intermediation 
difficult (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986, Binswanger and McIntire, 1987). Specialized 
agricultural financial institutions have been a failure all over the World (World Bank, 1993b, 
1996b) Cooperative institutions have been a success for larger farmers in some middle income 
countries such as Brazil. The micro-finance movement can make a modest contribution, but it 
has found it difficult to overcome the rural disadvantages and emerge as an important 
agricultural lender (Gine, 2004). Successful approaches to improving rural financial 
intermediation have been focused on savings mobilization, postal systems, and improving access 
to finance by the rural non-farm sector, input suppliers and marketing systems, including 
contract farming (Yaron et al. 1998). 
 
A successful intervention has been the policy of the government of India to force commercial 
Banks to open rural branches and reserve a proportion of their lending to agriculture and agro-
industry. Two separate studies have shown significant impact on agricultural growth and the 
rural wage (Binswanger and Khandker, 1996) 
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To conclude this subsection, the six off-farm margins which influence agricultural profitability 
are well known, and some of them have been the subject of studies for a number of years. It 
seems, however, that they are rarely studied together, and it is therefore often difficult to decide 
where the more important margins lie which should be the focus of intensive policy dialogue. 
Commodity chain studies which involve colleagues from other sectors would be a way to 
integrate the knowledge of all these margins in a more systematic way.  
 
Farm Level Efficiency and Profitability  
  
7. Irrigation and drainage  
The literature on the green revolution has shown how important water control was to enable 
farmers to benefit from the new technology and make high levels of input use profitable. In India 
the new varieties and higher input use spread first to those areas with the best water control in the 
Northwest and South, and moved East and to the Center later, partly as a consequence of 
investment by farmers in irrigation and drainage, and partly because research also started to 
make high yielding varieties available for dryland crops. Sub-Saharan Africa and other poorly 
performing countries are lagging badly in irrigation and drainage: Less than 7 percent of crop 
area in Africa is irrigated, compared to 33 percent in Asia (Gelb et al. 2000). Large scale 
irrigation has suffered from unaffordable costs and centralized bureaucratic institutions. While 
models for changing these institutions into autonomous entities partially or fully controlled by 
the farmers have been successful in some countries such as Mexico, and even the Office du 
Niger, this approach has not yet been replicated in many countries and systems, and therefore 
even rehabilitation is often not yet a viable option. Small scale irrigation is generally agreed to be 
a more promising option, but investments are constrained by low profitability of agriculture and 
therefore low investment capacities of the farmers.   
 
8. Land rights 
Farmers will rarely invest much in fixed assets unless they have secure land rights. While 
traditional tenure systems have often provided secure inheritable usufruct rights, in many parts of 
Africa they have come under pressure from rising population density and increased market   20
access (World Bank 2004, Economic Commission for Africa, 2005c). They also often failed to 
provide secure tenure rights to women, and to manage the potential conflicts which arise when 
immigrants need to be accommodated and enclosure of pasture threatens the livelihood of 
herders. Assisting these systems to evolve is therefore an important priority.  
 
Excessive inequality of land ownership tends to reduce access to land and efficiency of its use 
(Binswanger, Deininger and Feder, 1995). Large scale farms from Brazil to the Philippines and 
Zimbabwe and Namibia have under-utilized their land, and have depended on subsidies to reduce 
their dependence on hired labor via mechanization. Small farms on the other hand have 
inadequate access to capital to make their operations more efficient and improve their profits. As 
a consequence, both farm sectors suffer an efficiency loss. The World Bank has now become a 
major player in land reform programs in the countries that still have an important land reform 
agenda (Binswanger and Deininger, 1995).   
  
9. Soil erosion 
On an easily accessible website the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research 
summarizes the literature on what is known about this topic (CGIAR 2005). Neither higher 
population nor poverty necessarily lead to land degradation. In the transition from long fallow 
systems to permanent agriculture soil fertility declines and farmers eventually have to introduce 
new techniques to stem and reverse this decline. This they tend to do during the evolution of the 
farming system to higher land use intensity, as discussed so well by Ester Boserup (1965) and 
Hans Ruthernberg (1973), Their theories are consistent with an increasing number of studies 
which have shown that the normal processes of land improvement associated with agricultural 
intensification are taking place in many countries (Pingali, Bigot and Binswanger, 1987, Tiffen, 
Mortimore and Gichuki, 1994)  The literature also contains significant cases of soil degradation. 
These are often associated with open access regimes, insecurity of tenure, and other policy 
failure, which imply that the normal investment responses of individuals are impeded, and the 
necessary soil investments are not made. (Heath and Binswanger, 1996). 
 
Nevertheless, the alarmist view that in many parts of the developing World land is being rapidly 
and irreversibly degrading is exaggerated. When I started in the World Bank, a sector report   21
estimated that land losses in Burkina Faso amounted to something like 2 percent of GDP per 
year. Today it is clear that this scenario has not materialized, as documented by Kabore and Reij 
(2004), and as clearly visible to the naked eye: When I returned to Burkina Faso this past year, 
the land supported nearly twice the population than during my first visit in 1982, crops looked 
greener and healthier than I had ever seen them before, crop livestock integration had happened 
in many parts, degraded arid lands were being recuperated via traditional and new techniques, 
and a number of new crop varieties had been introduced, there were more trees on the land. Of 
course this does not mean that desertification and soil erosion are not a problem worthy of 
attention, only that we can be more optimistic than the usual rhetoric would want us to be. 
  
10. Gender relations 
In many parts of the developing world women are a majority of the agricultural labor force, and 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, they are the majority of the farmers. Yet their rights over land are often 
poorly developed, and they face disadvantages in access to education and health care, markets 
and capital. These restrictions have a negative impact on the efficiency of both men and women, 
and of agriculture as a whole. (Economic Commission for Africa, 2005c). Over the last decades, 
OECD countries have become a major advocates for women’s rights in the developing world, 
but entrenched social attitudes constrain the progress which has been achieved. 
  
11. Human capital 
A large literature confirms the importance of human capital for the efficiency of agriculture 
(Schultz, 1988). Rural areas suffer disadvantages in access to education, and health care. They 
also often have the poorest nutritional indicators. The paradox is that nutrition is often worst 
where food is grown! Access to food is determined by different factors than food production. 
 
Nevertheless, even the lagging countries have made significant strides in improving access to 
education, although with important variations among them. UNESCO (2004) uses the concept of 
school life expectancy to measure changes in education in a consistent way across countries and 
over time. The measure is the total number of years a child can expect to stay in school at the 
primary, secondary and tertiary level. In the period from 1990 to 2001 the greatest increase in 
schooling participation took place in Africa and South America, where the median school life   22
expectancy increased by 1.5 years. Yet by 2001 the school life expectancy in Africa was 7.8 
years while in Asia it was 9.9 years.   
 
Many health and education systems remain very centralized, focus on direct service provision by 
the state, and fail to empower the users. (World Bank, 2004a). It is hard to see how these systems 
will ever serve rural people well without radical decentralization, and greater involvement of 
communities and other non-state actors.  
 
Over the past two decades, HIV/AIDS has emerged as the single most important threat to human 
capital in Sub-Saharan Africa. Life expectancy in the hard hit countries has reverted to the levels 
prevalent at the time when I was born. Not only is human capital lost through the death of people 
in the prime of their lives, including agricultural extension staff, researchers, teachers, and 
medical personnel, the transmission of human capital from generation to generation because of 
higher dependency ratios and the huge  number of orphans. As shown by Bell, Devarajan and 
Gersbach (2003), the dynamic losses for heavy hit countries can be catastrophic.  
 
It is hard to see how agricultural and rural development will thrive in the hard hit countries of 
Africa unless the epidemic is stopped in its track. This can come about through more systematic 
prevention, and through free and universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment. In addition the 
impacts on the orphans must be mitigated by much better social protection programs. As an 
advocate both for stronger HIV/AIDS treatment, care and support programs as well as for 
decentralization and community-driven approaches I have argued elsewhere that all these 
programs will need to be highly decentralized and community driven, involve the private sector, 
and be coordinated at the local level (Binswanger et al, 2005).
7    
                                                 
7 The large scale World Bank HIV-AIDS programs in Africa emerged late (Mallaby, 2004). They now apply 
Community-Driven Development to the field of HIV/AIDS, and have developed the most decentralized and 
empowering approaches to fight the epidemic with the best chances for a truly scaled up response.  
   23
 
12. Technology: The ultimate source of agricultural profits and rural 
growth 
Despite the enormous growth in human population and incomes, for more than 150 years 
agricultural commodity prices have followed a declining trend. This astonishing phenomenon 
has been caused by the combination of increasing international trade and  sustained technical 
change in agriculture (Mundlak, 2001). Adaptation of the stock of scientific and technical 
knowledge to local conditions and implementation of new technology are most impressive in 
OECD countries, where the necessary investments have benefited from the huge distortions in 
favor of agriculture. Asia and parts of Latin America have also done well. In particular India and 
China have had some of the most impressive agricultural performances and therefore over a third 
of humanity has escaped the threat of famine during the past thirty to forty years.  
 
In the low performing countries of Africa agricultural yields are half or less than half those in 
other Regions of the World and they have been stagnating for a long time (Gelb et al. 2000). 
While there have been some notable advances in agricultural technology in Africa over the past 
thirty years, investment in agricultural research , whether measured per unit of output or per 
cropped area, has been much lower there than in any other Region of the World (Pardey, 
Roseboom and Anderson, 1991). This problem was already an issue in the mid 1970s, when I 
was attending my first international conferences at Airlie House (Arndt, Dalrymple and Ruttan, 
1977). Unfortunately over the past decade and a half, the International Community has had other 
priorities, and international support for agricultural technology, including from the World Bank 
has declined in real terms. I cannot see how African agriculture can prosper without bringing 
agricultural research spending to comparable levels as in the rest of the developing World.  
 
The under-performing countries could of course also benefit the large stock of already available 
technologies. Some of these could be readily implemented while others will require further 
adaptation. By improving the institutional environment for agricultural and rural development, 
and eliminating those barriers to profitability which are under their control, they could 
implement much of the available technology via processes of private and public investments.  
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The literature on the distribution of benefits from technical change is crystal clear that eventually 
most, if not all benefits from technical change in agriculture elude the farmers and are transferred 
to consumers in the form of lower commodity prices, the famous agricultural treadmill.  Evenson 
and Collin, (2003) show this for the Green Revolution from 1996 to 2000. It is therefore not 
sufficient to improve the institutional environment and eliminate the barriers to profitability in 
the low income countries so that they may adopt the already available technology. Unless they 
can produce a steady stream of new technology, the gain which they will be able to make will 
only be temporary. The gains will be quickly be eroded by declining agricultural prices. In a 
global agricultural system, agricultural profits will go to those who are ahead of the curve in 
terms of implemented technology, human capital and institutions. The under-performing 
countries will need to strengthen and re-build their agricultural research and technology adoption 
systems in the public sector, farmer’s organizations and the private sector to be able to compete 




What are the key priorities for the low performers?  
As emphasized in the introduction, priority setting in any given country must depend on an 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the countries policies, institutions and infrastructure, 
and on the opportunities of the country as determined by these, as well as its location and 
agroclimatic conditions. There are enormous variations in all of these factors and there are only 
few general recommendations that can be made, and even these are not magic bullets. The few 
which I dare to make are as follows:  
 
I regard further improvements in the institutional environment as critical for empowering rural 
people for their own development. As far as Africa is concerned, the fact that its governments are 
still the most highly centralized and have made relatively little progress especially in 
administrative and fiscal decentralization, would suggest that these areas deserve priority 
attention almost in all countries. It is also clear that the business environment in most of Africa 
still needs a lot of improvement. In particular corruption ranks with decentralization as the   25
lowest among more than a dozen governance indicators studied in the recent survey of 29 
countries by the Economic Commission for Africa (2005).  
 
Even though the Copenhagen Consensus (Lomberg 2004) did not focus specifically on 
agricultural and rural development of the lagging countries, I agree with three of their top 
priorities: Combating HIV/AIDS, further trade liberalization, in particular in agriculture, and the 
development of new agricultural technology, which they ranked respectively as their firs, third, 
and the fifth priority.  
 
Most Margins of Profitability Are Beyond the Control of Farmers  
Of the 12 margins or profitability, farmers only have partial or full control over three of them: 
the adoption and implementation of available technology, soil erosion, and irrigation and 
drainage. They can develop the capacity to influence several of these margins by organizing as 
farmers organizations to manage some of the services they need themselves, compete with other 
service providers, as well as putting them under competitive pressures. These include marketing, 
quality control, processing, agricultural credit, agricultural extension, management of irrigation 
infrastructure. To influence all the other margins, they need to organize politically at the local, 
national, and now even the international level, so that they can influence local, national and 
international policy, institutional, and funding decisions. 
  
The growing need of multi-sectoral approaches 
Improvements in four of the five institutional pillars of rural development involve a holistic, 
multi-sectoral approach, and only the sector pillar involves specific institutions of agricultural 
and rural development. Progress on the institutional environment for rural development therefore 
depends on intensive collaboration across sectors in analytical work, policy dialogue and 
institutional reform programs. Progress in moving in this direction has been most pronounced in 
work focusing on the central government pillar, the private sector, and involvement of civil 
society in policy and program discussions. But much more is needed. Work on the investment 
climate still does not systematically involve agricultural economists. Local and community-
driven development, and the associated decentralization and sector reforms cannot be pushed by   26
an individual sector and should be pursued as holistic agendas bringing together staff from all the 
relevant sectors.  
 
Of the 12 “margins of profitability” only four fall squarely into the realm of  agricultural and 
rural development specialists: Agricultural technology, soil erosion, irrigation and drainage, and 
phytosanitary restrictions. In all other areas progress depends on the work of, and/or 
collaboration with specialists in infrastructure, macro- and fiscal economics, human 
development, social development and social protection, gender, and more. While some progress 
has been made in moving towards multi-sectoral operations, many systems and incentives in the  
countries, donor organizations and the World Bank are tilted in favor of specific analytical work 
and operations in single sectors.     
 
While research on the institutional environment and on the margins of profitability is often quite 
good, but scattered in many different reports, disseminated to specialized audiences, and poorly 
used for policy dialogue. In addition there are often serious gaps. For example I am not aware of 
any recent comparative studies for low income countries which decompose the difference 
between world prices and farm gate prices of outputs and inputs such as fertilizers into the many 
margins of profitability. Such work is essential for a coherent policy dialogue and for politically 
mobilizing farmers’ organizations to fight for their interests, and equip them with the knowledge 
to do so effectively. What is needed here are a series of value chain studies for different 
commodities. These must not just be done for low performing countries, but also for high 
performing exporters such as Brazil and Thailand, in order to have standards against which the 
low performers can be compared.   
 
Outlook 
Our understanding of what it takes to develop agriculture and rural areas has steadily improved 
since I first became interested in these topics about 40 years ago. And progress has been huge for 
rural populations in most of Asia. In Latin America progress has been significant in terms of 
agricultural growth, but rural poverty has declined little. But sub-Saharan Africa and a number of 
other low performing countries have made little progress and rural poverty has increased. There 
is a lot of pessimism around the world these days, and I will not dwell on the reasons for that.   27
Instead I want to conclude by focusing on some positive trends, and changes in some underlying 
factors which may be more reasons for hope.  
 
The success of the high performers 
When I first became interested in agricultural development about 40 years ago, the profession 
was deeply pessimistic about China, South Asia, and South East Asia. It seemed impossible at 
that time that these Regions would become food self sufficient, and major exporters in a number 
of products. But it has happened, thanks to the Green Revolution, improving rural development 
policies and institutions. More recently the strong urban growth performance of many of these 
economies has fueled the demand for their agricultural sectors, and increasingly provides 
remunerative employment, and therefore also drives up rural wages. Sub-Saharan Africa has not 
yet been able to break out of its vicious cycle of poor governance, poor investment climate, 
centralized states, under-funding of agriculture, technological backwardness and aid dependence. 
But the continent is enormous, and does have a huge agricultural potential. It would be wrong to 
assume that it cannot or will not develop as other of the “hopeless cases” have. Of course 
conditions are different, but finding locally adapted solutions is a challenge, not an impossibility.  
 
The rise of democracy 
Over the past 20 years many of the former military regimes and other authoritarian states have 
moved towards democracy, greater space for communities, civil society organizations, and  
farmers’ organizations. Unfortunately the gains are not irreversible, and in many countries the 
depth of change leaves a lot to be desired (Economic Commission for Africa, 2005). 
Nevertheless I am hopeful that what we have seen is only a beginning. Working systematically 
on the institutional underpinnings of rural development will assist these forward movements.  
 
Agricultural policy reform in the low income countries 
Compared to agricultural policy changes in OECD countries, macro-economic, trade, and 
agricultural policy reforms in the Africa and other poorly performing countries over the past 20 
years has been very significant, as discussed previously in the paper. Again it is just a beginning, 
and the World Bank needs to keep up its pressure for more progress, especially on the   28
investment climate and the many margins of agricultural profitability which are still to be tackled 
systematically.  
 
International agricultural trade 
At the Regional level in Africa NEPAD and the African Union are fostering Regional 
integration, and the World Bank and other donors are supporting these efforts. The issue of 
agricultural subsidies of OECD countries has become the major issue of the current WTO 
negotiations. The current stalling of progress is hopefully only a temporary phenomenon. In any 
case the example of the area of textiles has shown that it we should expect that dismantling of the 
adverse agricultural policies may take 20 to 30 years.  
 
Political determinants 
As Klaus Deininger and I showed in the paper on “Determinants of Agricultural and Agrarian 
Policies in the Developing World,” poor performance and exploitation of rural populations have 
their roots in material conditions of rural areas -- special dispersion, seasonality and covariant 
risk -- which make it difficult for the rural poor to organize politically and prevent elite 
domination and the associated adverse institutions and policies. These material conditions of 
have not changed since we wrote this paper. But nevertheless many poorly performing countries 
have become more democratic, given more space to civil society, and invested at least modestly 
in education. In addition, the rise of the internet and the spread of cell phones means that these 
populations can no longer be kept in the dark, and social mobilization and political organization 
has become easier for widely dispersed populations. Farmers’ organizations and organizations of 
landless workers have become stronger, and started to make a real difference in some countries, 
such as Brazil, which has finally started to tackle its enormous land reform problem. Farmers’ 
organizations are also becoming an important interlocutor in the process of policy formulation in 
a number of African countries. At the same time donor organizations, including the World Bank,  
are fostering greater participation in policy formulation and program implementation via PRSPs, 
Anti-corruption programs, Social and Gender Assessments, programs to assist civil society 
organizations, support to universal primary education programs, and last but not least, 
Community-Driven Development.    29
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